61 On the other hand, other types of disagreements are understandable if we consider direct reference theories. First of all, the question may arise as to whether we can reconstruct the use of a particular word according to direct reference theories or according to the conventional pattern: to find that individuals use a word according to theories of direct reference, we need not only an empirical examination, but also an analysis of our hypotheses on the use of words, which is clearly evident in our reactions to contrafacturial situations. and the traditional character of a word should not be transparent to those who use it. 45 At the three levels that have just been presented, the differences of opinion relate to the law in general. The next four levels, which I will mention, relate to differences of opinion that occur within specific legal systems. And there are a few who disagree on that, but they can`t do anything. 15The stinging semantic argument is therefore not a problem for positivists. Convergence in the identification of the law is not relevant because of the nature of the word or concept (criteria or not), but because it is the result of a conceptual analysis. On the basis of conceptual analysis, positivism concludes that convergence is relevant in identifying the law, but this does not stem from the assertion that words or terms require the existence of common criteria.19 , the sources of the law and its interpretation. 42 This is also a simplification. One can imagine a legal system with a clumsy rule of recognition that states that statutes and morals are both law; All public servants can agree on this point. However, in cases where statutes and morality give contrary rules, controversy would arise.
There would therefore be differences of opinion on the sources, but not on the validity criteria. However, I do not think it would be a theoretical disagreement on the sources, but it would be extra-legal in nature and would lead to differences of opinion on the existence of moral principles. The same, but as far as interpretation is concerned, see Ratti 2008. According to Mr. Ratti (2008: 308 s.), many differences of opinion are based on the choice of an interpretation of a series of different and irreconcilable legal solutions, but equally justified. The existence of moral considerations in these interpretive controversies does not require us to accept that Dworkin is right from Ratti`s point of view, for these differences cannot be reconstructed as disagreements over sources; they are not disagreements, for example on whether or not natural law is a legal source. There are differences of opinion on second-order sources, i.e. on extra-legal criteria, to choose between antithetical law solutions that can be used when legal instruments have expired. In view of this reconstruction, many differences are moral and not legal and refer to what the law should be and not what it is.